LAW OFFICES OF GEOFFREY D. MUELLER, LLC

Per The New York Law Journal:

"The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit yesterday barred a company that streams live TV shows over the Internet from continuing to transmit the programming, finding that to hold otherwise would 'destabilize [an] entire industry' and inflict irreparable damage on the networks.

"In a unanimous decision, the court upheld Southern District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald (See Profile) and sustained a preliminary injunction barring ivi Inc. of Seattle from transmitting copyrighted material belonging to media powerhouses such as ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox Television and Major League Baseball."

Entire NYLJ article and full decision of WPIX v. ivi after the jump...

As discussed here: https://www.gdm-law.com/index.php?page=blog&display=92 a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court held in Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, A-28-10 that a rescue squad (as an entity) is not entitled to immunity under New Jersey law. Instead, the Court ruled that N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 immunizes only "officers or members" of rescue squads — along with doctors, nurses, some emergency technicians, and hospitals and their trustee boards and staffs — from liability in providing "intermediate life support services" in good faith.

Per the New Jersey Law Journal:

The bill, S-2165, sponsered by Sen. Christopher "Kip" Bateman, R-Somerset and co-sponsor, Sen. Anthony Bucco, R-Morris would add "first aid, ambulance or rescue squads" to list of entities and individuals that have statutory insulation from civil liability in emergency care situations.

More after the jump...

In reversing the Defendant's conviction of violating the federal Illegal Gambling Business Act, New York's Eastern District Judge Jack Weinstein wrote, "Bluffing, raising and folding require honed skills to maximize the value of the cards dealt by Lady Luck[.]"

The link to the complete 120-page decision can be found below...

Per The New Jersey Law Journal:

"An 18-year-old who wants to put herself through college is entitled to court-ordered emancipation over a parent's objections, an Ocean County judge has ruled.

"Superior Court Judge Lawrence Jones rejected her noncustodial father's resistance, which the judge summed up as 'an implicit suggestion' that she 'is simply too young at eighteen for entrustment with governing her own life.'"

From Ort v. Ort (approved for publication):

"Once a child of divorced parents turns eighteen years old, it is very common for the non-custodial parent to immediately attempt to emancipate the child and terminate child support. This case, however, presents a completely opposite issue: What happens when a child who turns eighteen seeks her own emancipation over parental objection, i.e., when a parent asserts that emancipation is premature or otherwise inappropriate because the child is allegedly still within the sphere of parental influence?"

More after the jump...

GUADAGNO, P.J.F.P. (temporarily assigned) writing for the Appellate Division:

"In this case we are asked to determine whether a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f, the 'seat belt law,' can serve as a predicate offense to support a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18(b), which proscribes knowingly violating a law or failing to perform a duty imposed by law intended to protect the public health and safety and recklessly causing serious bodily injury.  Defendant appeals her plea-bargained conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18(b), arguing the law is unconstitutionally vague and the seat belt law is not a law intended to protect the public health and safety as contemplated by this statute. We reject both arguments and affirm."

More after the jump...

Per The New Jersey Law Journal:

"In the Pennsylvania case, Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 2012 Pa. Super. 96 (May 7, 2012), a judgment in the amount of $92,943.41 was entered against John Pittas, for care rendered in a nursing home to Pittas' mother, under that state's filial responsibility law.  In September 2007, after completing rehabilitation for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, Pittas' mother was transferred to a nursing home owned by Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America (HCR), for long-term skilled nursing care and treatment.  She resided there and received treatment until March of 2008, when she relocated to Greece, leaving a large unpaid balance due to the nursing home.  Two months later, HCR commenced a lawsuit against her son."

New Jersey has a similar statute at N.J.S.A. 44:4-1 et seq. which gives standing to sue an "indigent" person's adult children to "two residents of the municipality or county" where the "indigent" person resides.  See N.J.S.A. 44:4-141.

Links to the Pennsylvania appellate decision and the thoughtful synopsis of William P. Isele, Esq. below.  (Registration required for the NJLJ article.)

In reversing the Appellate Division, with Chief Justice Rabner writing for a unanimous Court, per the Clerk's syllabus:

"The issues in this appeal are whether the exclusionary rule applies to a prosecution for a violent attack against a police officer after a possibly unlawful motor vehicle stop, and whether defendants would be entitled to racial profiling discovery to challenge Trooper Acevedo’s credibility at a new trial for attempted murder."

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"HELD: The exclusionary rule does not apply to a prosecution for attempted murder and related offenses after a possibly unlawful stop. An attenuation analysis is unnecessary. Defendants are not entitled to racial profiling discovery in seeking to suppress the drug evidence or to challenge the Trooper’s credibility at a new trial."

More after the jump...it probably didn't help the defendants' cause that they attacked the officer, tried to take his gun, got shot fleeing the scene and had nearly a pound of cocaine in their vehicle.

From the unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court syllabus:

"In this appeal, the Court determines the validity of Chapter 37 of the Laws of 2009, “Kyleigh’s Law.”

"New Jersey’s graduated driver’s license system (GDLS) requires a new driver to first obtain a permit and then a probationary license, before applying for a basic license. In general, holders of GDLS authorizations cannot drive between certain hours of the day, cannot drive with more than a certain number of non-parents and nondependents in the vehicle, and cannot use wireless devices. GDLS supports safety on the roadways by phasing-in new drivers’ exposure to driving tasks and environments under supervised conditions. Chapter 37 facilitates enforcement of GDLS restrictions by requiring individuals who are driving pursuant to permits or probationary licenses to display “removable, transferable, highly visible, reflective decals” on their vehicles. As applied by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, only drivers under the age of twenty-one must obtain and display the decals.

"Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that Chapter 37 is preempted by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-2725; violates equal protection; and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel found that the decal requirement is not preempted by the federal statute because disclosure of a person’s age group is not “personal information” under the Act; that the decal requirement does not violate equal protection because it is a rational and suitable means of furthering a legitimate and appropriate government interest; and that the decal requirement does not give rise to an unreasonable search and seizure because a driver has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her age group and an officer’s examination of the decal is not a “search.” The Court granted certification. 208 N.J. 369 (2011).

HELD: The judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division. Chapter 37 is not preempted by federal law, does not violate equal protection, and does not give rise to an unconstitutional search and seizure.

Full decision after the jump...

Per The New Jersey Law Journal:

"New Jersey's highest court has refused to recognize an emotional-distress cause of action for witnessing the grisly death of a pet, no matter how dear to the owner.

"'Although we recognize that many people form close bonds with their pets, we conclude that those bonds do not rise to the level of close familial relationship or intimate, marital-type bond,' the Supreme Court ruled on Tuesday in McDougall v. Lamm, A-99-10.

"The unanimous court refused to expand to pets the doctrine of Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980), which allows a suit for emotional distress by one who witnesses the death of a family member."

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Directly from the syllabus of  McDougall v. Lamm, A-99-10: